

HOLLAND AND PIM FORTUYN: A DEVIANT CASE OR THE BEGINNING OF SOMETHING NEW?*

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INTRODUCTION

In an earlier paper, we treated Sweden and the Netherlands as 'negative' or 'deviant' cases in the study on radical right populism (RRP) in Western Europe. Although both Sweden and the Netherlands fulfilled most of the conditions that according to established theories explain the emergence of radical right-wing populist (RRP) parties elsewhere, these parties had been relative failures in both Sweden and, in particular, the Netherlands (Rydgren & Van Holsteyn 2001; cf. Rydgren 2002). The paper was accepted for publication by a leading scientific journal, but was never published: the unexpected emergence and instant success of Pim Fortuyn and the smashing electoral result of his party List Pim Fortuyn [*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, LPF] at the Dutch general elections of 15 May 2002 came in between. The Netherlands could hardly be seen as an obvious negative or deviant case.

However, some time has passed and we are no longer that sure of the futility of revising the original article for publication. Rather, we believe that it can be an useful point of departure for two reasons: First, by looking at the explanation of why no RRP parties had emerged in the Netherlands during the 1990s, we may identify important factors that deserve great scrutiny also in explaining the

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success of Pim Fortuyn. We will pose the questions why they no longer hold true and in what ways—if any—they have changed. Secondly, as will be discussed below, we are not convinced that the List Pim Fortuyn represents a RRP party in the classical sense, although there are similarities. As Rydgren (2004) has argued, RRP parties are characterized by the combination of ethno-nationalist xenophobia (based on the so-called ethno-pluralist doctrine) and anti-establishment populism. And although List Pim Fortuyn's political ideas and rhetoric were based clearly on anti-establishment populism and xenophobia, ethno-nationalism as such was not really an issue. However, there are several reasons to treat List Pim Fortuyn as a functional equivalent to the classical RRP parties: it was electoral successful for approximately the same reasons as RRP parties elsewhere have been and fulfilled more or less the same political and electoral 'needs'. We will even argue or at least strongly suggest that List Pim Fortuyn may have been successful *because* it was only an incomplete version of a classical RRP party. As a result of the particular Dutch political culture, RRP parties (e.g. the Centre Democrats in the 1980s and 1990s) were easily and right from the beginning stigmatized and marginalized—and ethno-nationalism could not appeal to more than only a very small segment of the electorate. In order to mobilize anti-immigration sentiments, the immigration issue would first have to be detached from ethno-nationalism, framed in other terms, and then be put high on the political agenda—which is exactly what Pim Fortuyn did. This being the case, it is motivated to pose the question if not the success, however short-lived it may have been, of the List Pim Fortuyn may become an inspiration for embryonic contender groups in other countries where RRP parties have (largely) failed, such as England, Germany, and Sweden.

EXPLANATIONS OF THE EMERGENCE OF RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES

Our earlier analysis of the Netherlands (and Sweden, but we focus on the Dutch situation) as a deviant case was primarily inspired by and based on the influential writings of Hans-Georg Betz and Herbert Kitschelt, who have presented the most comprehensive, theoretically elaborate and influential explanations on the rise of RRP parties thus far. In addition they have written from a comparative perspective (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995).¹ Many themes

¹ There are, of course, others who have tried to formulate an explanation of the RRP parties from a comparative perspective. These articles are not seldom found as introductions or

mentioned by other authors (e.g., Ignazi 1992; 1996a; Inglehart 1997; Karapin 1998; Swyngedouw 1992) are in one form or another included in or implicated by the writings of Betz and Kitschelt.

From the works of Betz and Kitschelt we concluded that the successful emergence of RRP parties can be explained by a transition from industrialism to *postindustrialism* (i.e., RRP parties are not presumed to emerge in industrial or even pre-industrial societies), that has led to (1) changed political preferences for groups of voters (i.e., *right-authoritarian issue preferences*) and/or (2) an increased level of *frustration, anxiety, resentment* and *discontent* among the losers in the transformation process. The latter implies that the *protest* dimension plays a role for the emergence of RRP parties. Finally, *xenophobia* and *racism* were thought to be partial (although not sufficient) causes of the emergence and success of RRP parties. We also concluded that support for these parties is most likely to come from the losers of the contemporary postindustrial societies, i.e., from the unskilled and semiskilled workers, from the people with little cultural capital, etc.

In addition to the factors identified above but following this line of argument, others have suggested that the emergence of RRP parties can be explained by three factors. First, *the economic crisis* (e.g., Jackman & Volpert 1996). This crisis is assumed to lead to increased frustration, which may be canalised through outbursts of xenophobia and other kinds of right-authoritarian manifestations. Second, *the character of the elections*. A proportional voting system and elections of minor importance during the break-through years are seen as necessary conditions for the emergence of (new) extremist parties of the left and right in general and of RRP parties in particular (e.g., Ignazi 1996b; cf. Rydgren 2002 for a more detailed account of these explanations). However, as Rydgren (2003; 2004a; 2004b) has argued, an explanation focusing exclusively on demand factors is incomplete. We also need to know (1) if the party has used a political rhetoric that is resonant with available niches, and (2) if the party organization has succeeded to mobilize sufficient resources.

To sum up, we stated that the emergence of RRP parties is favoured by:

- 1) A postindustrial economy or society.
- 2) The dissolution of established identities, the fragmentation of the (political) culture, and multiculturalisation.

concluding remarks in anthologies bringing together single-country research on RRP parties (e.g., Betz 1998; von Beyme 1988; Earwell 2000; Hainsworth 1992; Hainsworth 2000; Weinberg 1993; see also Mayer 1999 and Lubbers 2001).

- 3) The emergence or growing salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension.
- 4) Widespread political discontent and disenchantment.
- 5) Popular xenophobia and racism.
- 6) An economic crisis.
- 7) A reaction against the emergence of 'New Left' and/or Green parties and movements.
- 8) A proportional voting system.

We then tried to find out if these conditions were fulfilled in the Netherlands during the 1990s, which did *not* see the emergence and success of a RRP party, as so many other countries did, but rather the disappearance of the already small existing RRP parties. At the general elections of 1998 the right-wing Centre Democrats, the major party from the Dutch extreme right for almost 15 years, lost all their three seats in parliament they had gained at the general elections of 1994. Before recapitulating this discussion, however, we will provide a brief description of the history of Radical Right Populism in the Netherlands as well as of the election campaign leading up to the election in May 2002.

RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

In the Netherlands it was not until the early 1970s that an extreme right political party manifested itself in the post-war period. This was the Dutch People's Union [*Nederlandse Volks-Unie*, NVU], founded on 27 March 1971 'with the purpose of creating a Greater Dutch State which would include the Dutch or Flemish speaking part of Belgium but exclude alien ethnic elements' (Voerman & Lucardie 1992: 38; cf. Bouw 1981; Lucardie 1998; Van Donselaar 1991). The NVU remained obscure until 1974, when for the local elections in the city of The Hague Joop Glimmerveen campaigned under the slogan 'The Hague should remain white and safe'. His radical, racist campaign almost got the NVU a seat in the city council and earned Glimmerveen the party leadership. This radicalisation of the NVU had drawbacks, however. Anti-racist organizations were founded, the party was legally prosecuted, and 'moderate' members left the party. Some of these ex-members founded a less radical party on 28 December 1979, the National Centre Party [*Nationale Centrumpartij*, NCP]. This party never really got started: after the first meeting some young members attacked illegal foreigners who took refuge in a church and one week later the party dissolved itself. The next day, 11

March 1980, the Centre Party [*Centrumpartij*, CP] was founded (cf. Brants & Hogendoorn 1983).²

In September 1982 the CP managed to get 0.8 percent of the total vote and in the extreme proportional Dutch electoral system this was enough for a single seat (out of 150) in the Second Chamber. Party leader Hans Janmaat became a member of parliament. The CP seemed to be on the rise: at a local by-election in 1983 it polled 9 percent and at the elections for European Parliament of June 1984 2.5 percent. According to a reputable polling organization it was a real danger that the CP would score a total of 5 percent (de Hond 1983: 13). But it was not to be. The prospect of success led to internal conflict of a political as well as personal nature. In October 1984 the party leadership expelled Janmaat, who soon joined the Centre Democrats [*Centrumdemocraten*, CD], a party that was founded on 7 November 1984 (Mudde & Van Holsteyn 2000; Lucardie 1998).

In the mid-1980s Dutch RRP parties almost disappeared from the scene. At the general elections of May 1986 the CD lost the seat that Janmaat had refused to give up when he left the CP.³ The CP was in even bigger trouble: the party scored disappointing results at the local elections of March 1986 and did not win any seat at the general elections that same year. Furthermore, the party was convicted of fraudulent electoral actions and because it could not pay the fine, it was declared bankrupt. A few days later the Centre Party '86 [*Centrumpartij '86*, CP'86] was founded, a party that developed into a much more radical extreme right party (Lucardie 1998; Mudde 2000).

It was a surprise—or a shock—that Janmaat returned to parliament in 1989. The CD scored 0.9 percent of the vote, enough again for one seat. Other RRP parties did not participate at these elections. The biggest electoral successes of these parties, however, came in 1994. With an average score of 7.4 percent in the constituencies (municipalities) that they contested, the parties of the centre movement—CD, CP'86 and the CD-splinter Dutch Block [*Nederlands Blok*, NB]—were very successful at the local elections of March 1994 (Buijs & Van Donselaar 1994: 117; Van Holsteyn 1995). At the subsequent general elections of May 1994 the CD won 2.5 percent of the votes and 3 seats in the Second Chamber (Mudde & Van Holsteyn 1994). Although this was the best electoral result in the post-war period for a Dutch RRP party at the national level, after the successes at

² It could be argued that this was the first 'successful' party of the so-called centre movement that dominated the RRP scene in the last two decades of the 20th century (cf. Mudde 2000: 120; Van Holsteyn & Mudde 1998; Mudde & Van Holsteyn 2000).

³ Members of the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament are formally elected on an individual base and are not obliged to give up their seat if they (have to) leave their parliamentary party or even their party.

the local elections Janmaat was very disappointed and thought that his party was the victim of fraud committed by or on instigation of the Internal Secret Service and/or Home Affairs. Also the polls had shown more support for his party, but after a peak in November 1993 with a monthly average of more than 5 percent the decline had already begun (Mudde & Van Holsteyn 1994: 129; 2000: 156). The CD polled less than 1 percent of the vote at the European elections in June 1994.

At the local elections of March 1998 the CD lost all but one of its seats (Van Holsteyn 1998), and at the general elections of May 1998 the CD scored only 0.6 percent of the vote and lost its 3 seats.⁴ Some time earlier, May 1995, the CP'86 was found guilty of being a criminal organisation by the Amsterdam Court; in 1998 the party was banned and finally dissolved. The successor to the CP'86, the Dutch People's Nationalists [*Volksnationalisten Nederland*, VNN] was founded in 1997, which in turn became the New National Party [*Nieuwe Nationale Partij*, NNP] in October 1998. A report on RRP parties and other forms of right-wing extremism in the Netherlands states that *all* RRP parties and organizations together in November 1999 had a total of 660 members, of which 55 to 85 can be called activists (Van Donselaar 2000: 70). For October 2002 the number of members and supporters was estimated on some 650, with a number of 55 to 125 active members and supporters (Van Donselaar & Rodrigues 2003: 56).

PIM FORTUYN AND THE ELECTION OF 2002⁵

On August 20, 2001, in a television interview, Pim Fortuyn, a former university professor of sociology and political columnist in a liberal-conservative weekly, an outspoken homosexual with a flamboyant lifestyle—Ferrari, Bentley with chauffeur, butler, two lap dogs, portraits of John F. Kennedy in his lavishly decorated Rotterdam home which he referred to as Palazzo di Pietro—announced his intention to run for parliament. He opted for a political career. An unusual aspect of the announcement was that it was not clear at all for which political party he might be a candidate. He was already in contact with the new party

⁴ Although the CD and the other Dutch RRP parties had to operate in a rather hostile societal, political and legal climate, the fact that in particular the CD as the most prominent RRP party did not manage to become a stable and well organised party has very much to do with the permanent internal struggles within the centre movement. For example, the leader of this movement, Hans Janmaat, was always very afraid of people conspiring against him - as he himself was always conspiring against his political enemies and even 'friends' within his own party or the rival parties of the centre movement (see Janmaat z.j.).

⁵ The following is based on and partly literally taken from Irwin and van Holsteyn (2003), van Holsteyn and Irwin (2003), and van Holsteyn, Irwin and Wen Ridder (2003).

Livable Netherlands [*Leefbaar Nederland*, LN], but for the moment he left three options open: LN, the Christian Democratic Appeal [*Christen Democratisch Appèl*, CDA], or his own party list (Chorus & de Galan 2002: 41). Initially he became the leader of LN, the national extension of a movement that had begun in a number of municipalities at previous local elections and that hoped to win a strong position at the national level as well, i.e. in Parliament. The party leaders of LN promised to resign if less than 10 seats in the Second Chamber were won on May 15 2002. On November 25 2001 Fortuyn was chosen as the party leader of Livable Netherlands. At the conclusion of his acceptance speech he spoke the famous words that became his 'slogan': "At your service". The 'pink populist' (Mudde 2002) had begun his short, spectacular and mortal political career.

In the meantime, after returning from his summer holiday, the popular party leader of the Labour Party [*Partij van de Arbeid*, PvdA] and prime-minister Wim Kok finally announced his decision to retire. On August 29 party leader Kok appointed the capable but not very popular politician Ad Melkert as his successor. The media reported that the change of leadership would cost Labour three seats (e.g., De Telegraaf, September 4, 2001). However, attention quickly shifted to another party, the CDA, where in September 2001 a leadership crisis broke out. In a struggle between the party leader and the party chairman in the end both resigned. The parliamentary party chose the almost completely unknown Jan Peter Balkenende as their leader and the party quickly followed by naming him the leader for the upcoming election campaign. There was considerable concern among christian-democrats that a leadership crisis so soon before the elections would have a negative impact on the voters. Indeed, the polls showed a loss of between 3 and 5 seats for the CDA (e.g., De Telegraaf, October 18, 2001). One of Balkenende's first moves was to announce that his party would follow a harder line towards asylum seekers. With hindsight this may have been an important move, since the issue of asylum seekers and all kind of real or supposed problems connected to ethnic minorities, immigration and integration were soon placed high on the political agenda, particularly by Pim Fortuyn. In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2002, problems related to asylum seekers, immigration and integration were seen as a major national problem by the Dutch electorate: 40 percent of all respondents mentioned this problem in response to an open-ended question regarding the most important national problems. Only problems in the health care system, e.g. the existence of long waiting lists, were mentioned more often (by 57 percent) (see Van Holsteyn 2003).

Only in December 2001 did the first signs appear of what was to come—and they were not taken very seriously. Polls showed a loss of seats first for the Liberals [*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD] and then for Labour. By

January, the polls were showing that LN and its leader Fortuyn had climbed to no less than 16 seats. In the same month it was announced that Pim Fortuyn would also head the list of candidates for the local party Livable Rotterdam [*Leefbaar Rotterdam*, LR] at the municipal elections in that city in March 2002.

As the election year 2002 began, the established parties began to show signs of nervousness. The issue of ethnic minorities, immigration politics and asylum seekers, often in one way or another combined with the issue of crime and law and order, moved to the top of the political agenda, probably not least as a result of the many speeches and numerous interviews given by Fortuyn. According to Fortuyn there were two major issues: the restructuring of the public sector and a restrictive policy on asylum seekers (Chorus & de Galan 2002: 86-87). The initiative to address the latter issue was clearly taken by Fortuyn. The other parties and politicians had to react and were placed on the defensive.

By February LN held more than 20 seats according to the polls, and at the same time the so-called 'purple' governmental coalition of Labour, Liberals and Democrats [*Democraten '06*, D66] had lost its majority. At this point Fortuyn had received disproportional and generally quite sympathetic attention in the media (Kleinjenhuis et al. 2003), but on Saturday February 9 an interview was published in one of the leading national newspapers which threatened to produce a sudden end of his march to power. In *de Volkskrant* he stated, contrary to the strong advice of his campaign team (Chorus & de Galan 2002: 143-154), that the Islam was a backward culture, that no new asylum seekers would be allowed, and that if proved necessary to protect freedom of speech, the first article of the Constitution should be repealed. This bombshell led the leadership of Livable Netherlands to dismiss him one day later as their political leader. On the same Sunday, however, Pim Fortuyn suggested in a television interview that although he preferred to continue with LN, the split was irreparable. He added that he might participate at the elections with his own List Fortuyn: "I have a mission, I have a job to do. I will continue."

Fortuyn had to go on his own. And to the surprise of many observers, who had held the opinion that Dutch voters voted primarily for a political party and not for an individual candidate, polls showed that even before he had a new party and a list of candidates, he took with him most of the support for Livable Netherlands. The Labour and Liberal parties continued to lose support in the polls and by March the CDA, which now also voiced more and more criticism of the coalition parties (of which the third party, D66, was already a negligible factor) had become the second largest party.

Despite the indications in the polls, the tremendous success of Livable Rotterdam, the local city list which retained Fortuyn as its leader, at the municipal

elections on March 6 came as a big surprise. Fortuyn's party, with the backing of more than one third of the total vote, became the largest single party in the municipal council. At the first television confrontation between Fortuyn and the other national party leaders, late in the night of this dramatic election day, the former beamed with his success, while Melkert, in particular, and the leader of the Liberal Party, Hans Dijkstal, slouched in their chairs with long faces. During the remainder of the campaign, neither was able to shake off this image of the 'poor loser': Kok interpreted the enormous electoral success of Fortuyn in Rotterdam as no more than a 'yellow card' for his purple governmental coalition (*De Telegraaf*, March 9, 2002). Just a warning...

After the municipal elections, the national campaign centered as much on Pim Fortuyn as on the issues. In debates only Paul Rosenmöller of GreenLeft [*GroenLinks*, GL] seemed able to respond to Fortuyn, while Balkenende generally stayed out of the firing lines, maybe as a result of a tacit agreement between Fortuyn and Balkenende and/or the sympathy Fortuyn felt for Balkenende (Chorus & de Galan 2002: 102, 250). The List Pim Fortuyn (LFF) reached a peak of 29 seats in the polls. One report even stated that in anticipation of the enormous success at the general elections Pim Fortuyn was remodeling his house to prepare for the great victory on May 15: 'The house should be in order for the balcony scene. The day after the parliamentary elections Fortuyn wants to address the nation' (Chorus & de Galan 2002: 209).

On April 14, Prime Minister Kok unexpectedly announced that he had submitted the resignation of the Cabinet to the Queen. Collectively the Cabinet took responsibility for the dramatic events in Sebnica (Bosnia) in the early 1990s. This resignation came in reaction to the publication of a lengthy scientific report by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation concerning the events. One interpretation of the resignation was that it created some distance for the Labour and Liberal party from their now much criticized coalition government, and also that it showed that the politicians of the established parties were not afraid to accept responsibility if serious political mistakes had been made. Somewhat surprisingly, however, there was almost no reaction to this resignation by voters, as measured by the election polls.⁶

⁶ In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2002 after the election of May 15 the respondents was asked if they remembered why the 'purple' cabinet of social-democrats, social-liberals and conservative-liberals fell. Almost 70 percent gave the correct reply, i.e. Sebnica. In a follow-up question they were asked if they thought it right that the cabinet was fallen on this particular issue. A small minority of 46 percent thought it was wrong, an equal group of 44 percent thought it was right, and some 10 percent did not give an answer or did not have an opinion.

As early as February 2002 it had been reported in the media that Fortuyn did not dare appear in public because of threats to his person. In March he was the victim of an attack by pie-throwing activists at the presentation of his new book (Fortuyn 2002), a bestseller—it was the best sold book in the Netherlands in the year 2002 written by a Dutch author, with some 150,000 to 200,000 copies sold (de Zwart 2003: 151–159); on the bestseller list of this year it came third, after books by Nicci French and Donna Tartt—called ‘The mess of eight purple years’ (*De puinhopen van acht jaar Paars*). Despite such incidents, the authorities never felt there was sufficient reason to provide extra protection for Fortuyn and he himself never requested it (Commissie Feitenonderzoek 2002). But on Monday, May 6 the country was shocked by the report on the early evening news of his assassination outside a radio studio. The campaign was immediately stopped and only resumed half-heartedly after the funeral.⁷ Some people suggested that the elections should be postponed. Pieter Langendam, one of the founders of the LPF, stated that ‘the bullet came from the left’ and fingers were pointed in particular at Melkert and Rosenmöller. This further poisoned the already tense electoral atmosphere, although after the elections of May 15 a large majority of over 80 percent of the electorate, i.e. respondents of the Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study (DPES) of 2002, stated that political parties and politicians were not to blame for the killing of Fortuyn.

When all had settled and the votes were counted on the evening of May 15, the final results (see Table 1) were different than the last published polls had indicated. The losses by the Labour and Liberal parties were the largest ever suffered and the CDA emerged as the largest party, vaulting Balkenende into position as the leading candidate for Prime Minister. The LPF received 17 percent of the vote and 26 seats in Parliament. This was a record number of seats for a new party; the previous record had been only 7 seats (won by D66 on its first outing in 1967).

During the campaign Fortuyn was accused of being an extremist, even a right-wing extremist. In particular after the infamous interview in *de Volkskrant* people reacted this way. In his reaction to this interview the leader of D66, Thom de Graaf, referred to the Diary of Anne Frank and the leader of GroenLinks, Paul Rosenmöller explicitly called the ideas of Fortuyn ‘not just right, but extreme right’. However, there may be reasons to question the inclusion of Pim Fortuyn

⁷ A large majority of over 80 percent of the respondents of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2002 agreed with the fact that the campaign was stopped after the death of Pim Fortuyn. A small majority of 53 percent thought that it was okay that the campaign was restart again after some days; a large minority of 46 percent disagreed.

and his LPF within the family of radical right populism.⁸ He was a populist, used a fierce anti-immigration rhetoric (in particular against Muslims), and was emphasizing law-and-order. On the other hand, neither Pim Fortuyn nor his party was radical nationalist, against the EU, or defended traditional authoritarian values; he was an open homosexual, for instance, and his LPF was seen as even more liberal with regards to the issue of euthanasia than D66, the party that always promoted a very liberal stance towards this ethical issue (Van Holsteyn, Irwin and Wen Ridder 2003). In fact, it was the socio-culturally liberal values of the Netherlands, and in certain respects of the West generally, that Pim Fortuyn wanted to protect from the ‘backward’ Islamic culture. The anti-immigration rhetoric was largely framed in terms of protecting the rights of women and sexual minorities in Holland from the allegedly oppressive Islamic culture. This rhetoric was often stereotypical (i.e., no real distinctions were made between fundamentalists and more or less secularized Muslims), and it was never mentioned that there were other religious groups, including Christian groups, that were against homosexuality, etc., as well (see Kaupi 2003). In connecting immigration with criminality, which RRP parties typically do as well, Pim Fortuyn used the frame of ‘inverted racism’, in claiming that immigrants never rob one another; only Dutch people. However, although Fortuyn wanted to stop further immigration—with the argument that refugees should be harbored by neighbor countries (which means that the Netherlands would agree to harbor refugees and asylum seekers from Belgium, Germany, and probably the UK; but not from Iran or Somalia, for instance), he was in strong favor of integration—or, rather, assimilation—of immigrants already staying in the Netherlands, provided that they followed the norms of the Netherlands’s society (Fortuyn 2002; Mudde 2002). There are hence similarities as well as differences between Pim Fortuyn/List Pim Fortuyn and the parties deemed to belong to the party family of extreme right-wing populism.

Yet, and this is an important point to make, Pim Fortuyn and his List can be treaded as functional equivalences to RRP parties. We will develop the hypothesis that voters voted for List Pim Fortuyn for approximately the same reasons as they have voted for RRP parties elsewhere in Western Europe; because of anti-immigration sentiments and political discontent and cynicism (see e.g., Rydgren 2003a: Chapter 2; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2003; Van Holsteyn and Irwin, 2003; Van Holsteyn, Irwin and Den Ridder, 2003).

⁸ The most extensive analysis of the political ideas of Pim Fortuyn and the development of these ideas throughout his career is Pels (2003).

Table 1. Election results in the Netherlands, 1998 and 2002.

Political party	% of vote		% of vote		Number of seats	
	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	27.9	18.4	43	29		
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)	17.0	---	26	---		
Liberal Party (VVD)	15.4	24.7	24	38		
Labour Party (PvdA)	15.1	29.0	23	45		
GreenLeft (GL)	7.0	7.3	10	11		
Socialist Party (SP)	5.9	3.5	9	5		
Democrats 66 (D66)	5.1	9.0	7	14		
Christian Union (CU)*	2.5	3.3	4	5		
Political Reformed Party (SGP)	1.7	1.8	2	3		
Living Netherlands (LN)	1.6	---	2	---		
other parties	0.7	3.1	---	---		
total number of seats			150	150		
turnout	79.1%	73.3%				

* For 1998 the results of the two parties that formed the Christian Union before the elections of 2002 (Reformed Political League, GPV, and Reformed Political Federation, RPF) are combined.

EXPLANATIONS REVISITED

Economic Crisis

Economic factors are presumed to be important for the emergence of RRP parties. Both Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1995) point expressly to the fundamental economic transformation processes that have taken place in western societies and its political consequences.

First, there is no doubt that the Netherlands are as marked by a postindustrial economy and belong to the group of advanced industrial democracies as other Western European democracies (Dalton 1999; cf. Eurostat 2001). This characteristic is according to Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1995: 53) a basic condition for the emergence of RRP parties.

Second, the Netherlands suffered economically during the *first* half of the 1990s. There is ample evidence for economic pessimism among Dutch voters in

the first half of the 1990s, at least in comparison to the second half of the 1990s. For example, in 1993 43 percent of the respondents in a survey by the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) foresaw an economic crisis, while both in 1996 and 1997 this was only 18 percent. In 1998, when RRP parties (i.e. the Centre Democrats) disappeared from the scene, a crisis was foreseen by 38 percent. With regards to their personal financial situation or private economy, in 1993 no more than 12 percent thought that their income would rise in the near future, compared to 33 percent in 1996, 42 percent in 1997 and 38 percent in 1998. Another indication of economic pessimism in the early 1990s is the fact that in 1993 only 7 percent expected a rise in social benefits, while this percentage was 17 and 26 percent in 1996 and 1997 respectively (SCP 1999: 9-13; cf. SCP 1998: 125-127).

In 1994, less than 15 percent of the Dutch voters felt that governmental performance had had a favorable impact on the economy, on employment, or on their personal finances. It is very likely that this dissatisfaction had a strong negative influence on the vote for the two coalition partners, CDA and PvdA, and contributed to their dramatic losses that year (Kaashoek 1995). By 1998, however, the 'Dutch disease' was somehow becoming the 'Dutch miracle' (Visser & Hemerijck 1999; Kernan 2003) and the government was able to take some of the credit. Twice as many voters as in 1994 felt that government performance had had a favorable influence on their own personal finances, and solid majorities of 58 and 62 percent felt that governmental performance on the economy and employment had been favorable.

The rise and success of the LPF in 2001 and 2002 cannot be contributed to economic pessimism or a negative evaluation of governmental policy. In 2002 the evaluation of the voters concerning governmental economic performance was as solid as in 1998. The percentage stating that governmental performance had been favorable for the economy slipped just slightly to 52 percent, but on the other indicators the percentages actually increased. Fully two-thirds felt that the government had had a favorable impact on the economy and more than one-third even felt that the government had had a favorable impact on their own personal finances. What government and coalition parties would not have been pleased with such excellent evaluations! And what party would not have attempted to run its electoral campaign to profit from this positive evaluations and massive support? Yet, those three coalition parties that had been responsible for such solid economic performance—no sign of any mess from eight purple years from the socio-economic perspective—lost 43 of their 97 seats in Parliament. Clearly it was *not* the economy that was uppermost in the minds of Dutch voters on May 15, 2002. Indeed, only 3 percent of the respondents of the DPES 2002 mentioned 'the economy', with 2 percent mentioning 'inflation', 3 percent 'social security' and 4

percent 'unemployment' as among the most important national problems in the Netherlands in early 2002.⁹

IMMIGRATION, XENOPHOBIA AND RACISM

The immigration issue, together with the fact that a majority of the voters—or nearly so—in most West European countries subscribe to xenophobic views, has been important for RRP parties as a mobilizing factor and as a catalyst in triggering support (Betz 1994: 130; Kitschelt 1995: 103, 276). In fact, xenophobia provided RRP parties with one of their most effective rhetorical means, that is, to find a scapegoat to whom social and economic problems could be ascribed. Even though the RRP parties cannot and should not be seen as single-issue parties only stressing the (anti-)immigration issue (Mudde 1999; 2000), xenophobia nonetheless is a *sine quo non* for the RRP parties. And although not all voters with xenophobic attitudes do vote for a RRP party, almost every voter who *does* vote for a RRP party has xenophobic views and attitudes (see e.g., Mayer 1999).

The Netherlands has been a country of immigration for quite some time, and the influx of non-European immigrants increased during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s (for the 1990s, see Eurostat 2001). Also, in the period 1990-1999 the average number of applications for asylum (per 1000 inhabitants) was 22 in the Netherlands, compared to, for example, 18 in Belgium, 16 in Austria, 5 in France and 1 in Italy (SCP 2000: 51; see also Vink & Meijerink 2003). However, as Kitschelt (1995: 62) has argued, the presence of non-European immigrants in a country does not in itself explain the emergence of successful RRP parties. The influx of new residents (e.g. immigrants, asylum seekers) must be combined with the presence of popular xenophobia and the salience of the immigration issue to be political and electoral 'effective'.

In the Netherlands attitudes towards immigrants were divided but more or less stable in the mid-1990s (SCP 1998; 1999). This does not mean, however, that there were no xenophobic attitudes. In the years 1991-1997 about half of the Dutch population thought that there were too many foreigners in the country (SCP 1998: 700-702). There was also widespread doubt whether these foreigners would

⁹ It was only after the elections of 2002 that indications of an economic recession became evident. In the campaign for the new elections of January 2003 economic issues were high on the political agenda again. Various economic problems entered the top 10 of national problems as mentioned by the respondents of the DPES 2003. This may partly explain the electoral loss of the LPF at these elections and the strong recovery of Labour in particular (see Van Holsteyn 2003).

adjust themselves to Dutch society. Most people thought that they would hold on to their customs and traditions (SCP 1998: 137).

The salience of the immigration issue increased during the 1980s and 1990s in several West European countries (Solomos & Wrench 1993: 4). Until 1994 in the Netherlands the issue of immigrants, asylum seekers and other 'foreigners' was almost never mentioned as a major national problem in the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies. For example, in 1986 and 1989 only 2 and 3 percent respectively gave this as a *first* answer to the question to what the most important problem in the country was. In 1994, however, this figure jumped to 26 percent (Aarts 1995: 178).¹⁰ [A]pproximately half of the respondents mentioned the problem of minorities as one of the most important national problems. This figure placed it first on the list, followed by problems related to unemployment, social welfare benefits, public order and the environment' (Irwin & Van Holsteyn 1997: 112). Also in 1994 a majority of Dutch voters thought that foreign workers and ethnic minorities had to adjust themselves to Dutch culture; one out of four voters even thought that these people had to adjust completely (Anker & Oppenhuys 1995: 62).

Still, neither the presence of popular xenophobia nor the salience of the immigration issue guarantees the emergence of a RRP party. One reason for this imperfect relationship is that the immigration issue must become politicised, i.e. translated into political terms at the level of the parties as well as of the voters (Campbell et al. 1960: 29-32).¹¹ The immigration issue is not a 'real' political issue as long as it is not high on the political agenda. Before 2002, however, the immigration issue was not especially important to the Dutch voters, or at least this issue was not relevant in their party choice; where at the general elections in the 1980s and 1990s political issue were a reason for a particular party choice for between 15 and 25 percent of the voters the immigration issue, however, was seldom mentioned among these issues (Van Holsteyn 1994; 2000). Further analysis made clear that even in 1994 this issue did not have 'a major, independent impact upon the vote' (Irwin & Van Holsteyn 1997: 113). This all changed dramatically in 2002, when in particular Pim Fortuyn was stressing this issue. He was able to get the issue on top of the agenda. And voters knew he was. They almost unanimously perceived the LPF as the political party with clear and strong views with regards towards the sending back of new asylum seekers and as the party that more than other parties stressed the assimilation of ethnic minorities

¹⁰ In 1998 it was back to some 18 percent (Aarts et al. 1999: 700-702).

¹¹ However, the direction of the causality is not always easy to establish in this case: sometimes the immigration issue is politicised by an emergent RRP party (cf. Rydgren 2003a; 2003b).

who were already in the Netherlands. The Dutch electorate had not so much changed its views on asylum seekers and the immigration and the integration issue, but in 2002 there suddenly was a political party, i.e. the LPF, that said what they had thought for years but were never able to express at elections (see Van Holsteyn, Irwin and Wen Ridder 2003). With the arrival of the LPF there was a change in the supply side of electoral politics. For a specific segment of the Dutch electorate this change was warmly welcomed.

In estimating a regression model of the vote for List Fortuyn in 2002 and the popularity of party leader Pim Fortuyn, Van Holsteyn and Irwin (2003) show that the two issues that account for the greatest amount of this explained variance are "sending back asylum-seekers" and "foreigners should adapt". As indicated above, political parties in the Netherlands had until 2002 been extremely reticent to interject the "foreigners" issue into electoral politics and election campaigns. In the past the Liberal Party had done just enough to be seen as the party that was most apprehensive about the role of immigrants in society, but the issue never became a major campaign issue. That is, until Pim Fortuyn arrived on the scene and began "to say the things we have all been thinking." The electorate received the message clearly. Other issues also have a weak but statistically significant impact on the evaluation of Fortuyn. People who favored increasing differences in income levels, who wanted the government to be tougher on criminals, or who would allow new nuclear power plants to be built, were all more likely to evaluate Fortuyn more highly. However, the immigration issue was the outstanding reason for the support of Fortuyn.

POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION AND ALIENATION

Political discontent and alienation have been depicted as important causes for the emergence of the RRP parties, because of repelling voters from the established parties and opening up niches for new parties. Hence, dissatisfaction and alienation may be of importance in two ways: First, as a prerequisite for popular protest, which is supposed to be a basic condition for the emergence of protest parties and negative voting (Catt 1996); second, and in a more indirect manner, by releasing the voters from their bonds to the established parties (which is a prerequisite for the emergence of all kinds of new parties). Here, the decreased level of party identification and structured (class and religious) voting (which will be discussed below) is of particular importance as well.

In all known democracies, and at all times, there have been people who are dissatisfied with the political system and its institutions. However, the extent,

depth and intensity of this kind of political dissatisfaction or even political crisis are not constant. There are 'periodic cycles of hope and fear' (Norris 1999c). Recently the confidence in political institutions as well as in politicians has been declining in most Western democracies.¹² In a recent survey of the West European democracies, the US, and Japan, Putnam and others conclude that the confidence in politicians has declined in 12 of the 13 countries for which comparable data are available (Putnam et al. 2000: 14). This result corresponds with Dalton's conclusion that there is "clear evidence of a general erosion in support for politicians in most advanced industrial economies" (Dalton 1999: 63). At the same time, the public confidence in parliament has declined in 11 of the 14 countries that were represented in the survey (Putnam et al. 2000: 19). Also according to Dalton (1999: 67) "support for institutions of political authority has weakened in advanced industrial democracies." Although Klingemann found no evidence of growing dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of government and popular commitment to the principles of democracy is still strong, citizens at the same time "are frustrated with how contemporary democratic systems work—or how they do *not* work" (Dalton 1999: 75; Klingemann 1999: 56). Citizens of the advanced industrial democracies have become critical citizens (Norris 1999b). These critical citizens may value democracy as an ideal, but they "remain dissatisfied with the performance of their political system, and particularly the core institutions of representative government" (Norris 1999a: 269). This may have created good opportunities for the emergence of RRP parties.

The Netherlands may well be an exception to the rule that popular dissatisfaction is increasing in advanced industrial democracies. Table 2 shows that Dutch citizens on the whole are very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy worked in their country in 1996, although Danish and Irish citizens were even more satisfied. And with respect to their trust in politicians the Dutch case appears to be an exception as well: "The sharpest deviation from the pattern of declining trust [in politicians] is the Netherlands. The two longest Dutch opinion series—MP's don't care and politicians are only interested in votes—show statistically significant improvements between 1971 and 1994" (Dalton 1999: 65). Nor do other indicators of political dissatisfaction, distrust or cynicism show that in the 1990s Dutch voters have become more disappointed or alienated from their political system or politicians (Irwin & Van Holsteyn 2002; van Gunsteren &

¹² Note that the concept of political support is multi-dimensional, that political trust depends upon the object, and that for a full understanding of political trust a distinction should be made between the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors (cf. Norris 1999c; see also the other contributors in Norris 1999b). For our argument here, the examples given suffice, however.

Andeweg 1994). For the Netherlands there is no reason to assume that in the last decades the dissatisfaction with the way the system and the politicians function has increased (SCP 1999: 28; see also Andeweg & Thomassen 2003: 26–35).

Table 2. Level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, spring 1996
Question: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way the democracy works (in your country)?"

Country	Very or fairly satisfied (in %)
1. Denmark	84
2. Ireland	70
3. <i>Netherlands</i>	64
4. Finland	63
5. UK	61
6. Germany (west)	57
7. Sweden	55
8. Austria	53
9. Spain	52
10. France	51
11. Portugal	49
12. Belgium	45
13. Germany (east)	39
14. Italy	20

Source: S. Holmberg, 'Svenska folket är så där nöjda med hur demokratien fungerar i Sverige', in S. Holmberg and L. Weibull (eds.), *En missnöjt folk? SOM-undersökningen 1996* Göteborg: SOM-institutet 1997), p. 338.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that there is nothing rotten in the state of the Netherlands. First, although there has been no increase in, for example, political cynicism, it is nevertheless the case that during the 1990s and in 2002 more than 85 percent of the Dutch voters (fully) agreed with the statement that although they know better, politicians promise more than they can deliver; around 30 percent think that ministers and state secretaries are primarily concerned about their personal interests; and more than 35 percent is of the opinion that one is more likely to become a member of parliament because of one's political friends than because of one's abilities. The political cynicism score, based on these three items, shows that both in 1994 and in 1998 18 percent of the Dutch voters have the highest score—i.e. a 'cynical' response to all three items (Anker & Oppenhuis 1995: 175–176; Aarts et al. 1999: 500–501). As shown

below, the increase in political cynicism continued after 1998, although there was only a slight increase.

Second, Dutch citizens have good reason to be dissatisfied with the way the Dutch political system does *not* work (Dalton 1999: 75). Dutch citizens have a shopping list of unfulfilled political wishes (Irwin & Van Holsteyn 2002; SCP 1999: 37). For example, opinion polls since the early 1970s show a majority for the introduction of the referendum in the Netherlands, but the necessary legislation still has to be adopted. Already in 1967 an opinion poll showed that a majority of the Dutch citizens wanted to elect their mayor; the mayor, however, still is appointed; the cabinet of CDA, VVD and D66 that was formed after the January 2003 elections developed a new plan for the direct election of mayors, but it remains to be seen whether this will become reality in 2006 (as planned). On various occasions a substantial minority or even a majority of Dutch voters expressed their wish to elect the Prime Minister, but up to this day popular influence on the selection of the political leader of the country is wanting. To put it briefly, Dutch citizens may not be dissatisfied with the political system they have, but they may have good reason to be dissatisfied and frustrated with the fact that several adjustments and improvements have never been realized.

Table 3. Evaluation of Fortuyn, satisfaction with government, and cynicism and the vote for LPF

Evaluation (sympathy) Fortuyn:	Low	Medium	High
Low Cynicism			
Satisfied with government	- (84)	- (150)	15% (54)
Neutral	2% (57)	3% (184)	16% (63)
Dissatisfied with government	- (16)	4% (2)	42% (17)
Medium Cynicism			
Satisfied with government	- (31)	- (84)	10% (30)
Neutral	- (28)	2% (110)	27% (67)
Dissatisfied with government	- (11)	6% (51)	43% (53)
High Cynicism			
Satisfied with government	- (12)	9% (34)	41% (27)
Neutral	- (23)	3% (71)	41% (29)
Dissatisfied with government	- (11)	17% (36)	53% (59)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are number of respondents on which percentages are based.

Source: Adopted from Van Holsteyn & Irwin (2003: 61).

These developments were important for the emergence and electoral success of List Pim Fortuyn in 2002. It has been stated that Fortuyn was an anti-establishment, populist figure whose appeal was directed towards those who were more cynical towards politics in general (Mudde 2002). Table 3 examines the impact of three factors (political cynicism, general satisfaction with government, and popularity of Fortuyn) on the vote for the LPF. It shows that it was indeed the cynical and dissatisfied, when combined with a high regard for Fortuyn, who voted strongly for the LPF. As noted already, without at least a medium evaluation of Fortuyn—who was seen as much more sympathetic after he was killed than before, it should be noted (Van Holsteyn & Irwin 2003: 57)—there was no reason to vote for the LPF. Fortuyn was the party, and aside from him, there was obviously no reason to vote in its favor. Dissatisfaction with government performance, combined with the high evaluation of Fortuyn, led to a strong likelihood of voting for his LPF. Whatever the level of cynicism of the voter, more than 40 percent of such dissatisfied voters cast a vote for the LPF. A high level of cynicism leads to similar results: among voters who were highly cynical, more than 40 percent cast a vote for the LPF, whatever they thought of the performance of the previous government. When cynicism and dissatisfaction are combined, and when Fortuyn was highly evaluated, the percentage climbs to above 50 percent.

To conclude, the personal popularity of Pim Fortuyn, when combined with a cynical attitude towards politics and/or dissatisfaction with the incumbent government, explains a great deal of the electoral support for the LPF.

DECLINE IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND STRUCTURED VOTING

Two important indicators of the stability, or instability and volatility, of voter behaviour are party identification and structured voting, i.e. voting behaviour that is determined by underlying dimensions such as social class and/or religion (Rose & McAllister 1986; Irwin & Van Holsteyn 1989). The notion of party identification is used to characterise the individual voter's affective orientation to a political party (Campbell et al. 1954; 1960). It is assumed that party identification is a stable, enduring attitude. Put bluntly, unless something extraordinary happens voters with a party identification vote for the political party they identify with. In the Netherlands, however, the concept of party identification has never been as useful in electoral research as it has been in most other political systems. As early as the mid-1970s it was shown that party identification was not as stable

as it was expected to be, that in fact it was less stable than party choice itself, and that it was more likely the result than the cause of party choice (Thomassen 1976; Van Der Eijk & Niemöller 1983). However, something like party affiliation did and does exist in the Netherlands and this indicator of the relation between political parties and voters for the years 1971-1994 did not show any sign of a crisis of loyalty (Niemöller & Van Der Eijk 1990; Niemöller 1995: 146). At the same time, however, elections show much more volatility than they did before (Irwin & Van Holsteyn 2000). In the 1990s many voters made up their mind late in the campaign: in the 1970s only about 10 percent decided in the last days before polling day for which party to vote, in the 1980s this was between 10 and 20 percent, and in both 1994 and 1998 it was 25 percent (in 2002 it was even 29 percent). And while in the 1970s a majority of the voters said they always voted for the same political party, in the 1990s no more than around 35 percent did and in 2002 less than 30 percent (Van Holsteyn 1995; Aarts et al. 1999: 369).

This increase of instability or volatility in the Netherlands had less to do with a decreasing number of voters identifying with a party than with the typical Dutch process of 'depillarization' (*ontzuiling*), i.e. a process in which structured voting was in decline. Structural factors such as social class and religion in particular were less dominant in determining voting behaviour and party choice. In many countries, e.g. Sweden, social class was the most relevant structural factor; in the Netherlands it was religion.¹³

Electoral behaviour in the Netherlands has long been of a highly structured nature. Political parties emerged that were tightly related to specific social groups or segments of Dutch society; based primarily on the religious cleavage and secondarily on social class, so-called pillars existed (Lijphart 1968; 1974; Irwin & Van Holsteyn 1989). Voting behaviour was structured by this system of pillarization: in 1956 72 percent of the vote in the Netherlands could be explained by knowing the religious affiliation, church attendance and social class of a voter (Andeweg 1995). From the mid-1960s onwards, however, a process of depillarization and secularisation manifested itself and as a result the structured model of voting behaviour gradually lost its explanatory power. The three variables that could explain party choice of three out of every four voters in the 1950s could only explain 38 percent of the vote in the late 1990s, and only 28 percent in 2002 (see Table 4). This was mainly the result of the declining influence of religion on voting behaviour (Van Holsteyn & Irwin 2000; Dogan 2001: 105).

¹³ See Knutsen (2004) for a comparative analysis of the relation between religion and party choice for the period 1970-1997.

Table 4. Electoral choice according to the structured model of voting behavior, 1956-2002

	1956	1968	1977	1986	1998	2002
Practising Catholic voting KVP/CDA	95%	72%	66%	66%	53%	66%
Practising Dutch Reformed voting ARP, CHU/CDA	63	55	52	58	44	53
Practising Calvinist voting ARP, CHU/CDA	93	78	75	58	44	43
Secular working class voting Labour Party (PvdA)	68	65	67	60	51	34
Secular middle class voting Liberal Party (VVD)	32	25	30	28	31	19
total percentage of voters explained with the structured model of electoral behavior:	72%	60%	54%	44%	38%	28%

Source: Andeweg & Irwin, 2002: 91 (for the years 1956-1998); figures for 2002 based on the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2002

To sum up, in the Netherlands party identification never was of political significance and religion has become an important electoral factor for a very small and still diminishing group of voters only. So "the growing individualization of voting behaviour is the result of the parallel decline of the class vote and the religious vote and also of the decline in partisanship, with all the advantages and risks that this independence brings with it" (Dogan 2001: 114). One of these risks may be the substantial space available for the emergence of a new party—which was exactly what happened in 2002.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

When concluding our earlier paper on the Netherlands as a 'negative' or 'deviant' case, we found it somewhat puzzling that no Dutch RRP party had emerged: voters had become much more volatile due to the decreased importance of religion in structuring the voting behaviour, although Dutch voters seemed to be relatively happy about the way democracy worked, there was an increase in political cynicism; and, finally, there was popular xenophobia—factors that all are part of established explanations of successful RRP parties elsewhere.

However, we also found one important factor that worked against the emergence of a Dutch RRP party: although there was xenophobia, the immigration issue was of very low importance for the voters' decision how to vote. Until the end of 2001 immigration was not a full-fledged politicised issue in Dutch politics. The issue was not on the political agenda; political parties even

appeared to be afraid of addressing the issue during election campaigns. Most if not all politicians of the established parties collectively feared the negative gut reactions of the voters when they would talk about the problems of minorities, immigration and integration. The issue was a political taboo. It is precisely here we find the most important change, which explains a great deal of the emergence of Pim Fortuyn and the electoral success of his List Pim Fortuyn in May 2002. Although List Pim Fortuyn cannot be included in the family of radical right populism, it drew on the same issues: anti-immigration and anti-establishment protest. He said what other politicians dare not say for a long time, and what many voters already thought for a long time.

Hence, not only the immigration issue, but also political cynicism—which became more manifest during the election campaign of 2001-2002—played a role for the election result.

Secondly, we may assume that List Pim Fortuyn was successful because it did not, unlike the RRP parties, base its political profile on ethno-nationalism. Ethnic nationalism did never get any stronghold in the Netherlands during the post-war period. Rather, national pride has been based on support for the tolerant liberalism characterizing Dutch culture (see De Foer 2002; Kauppi 2003). By framing anti-immigration discourse as a defence of tolerance and socio-cultural liberalism, perhaps Pim Fortuyn may have been able to attract voters that never would have been attracted by a RRP parties' socio-cultural authoritarianism.

Thirdly, an aspect that has only been indicated above, also the personality of Pim Fortuyn played an important role for the electoral success. The 2002 parliamentary election and the campaign that preceded it provided a unique opportunity to test the party versus candidate hypothesis. The crucial test came in February 2002. As noted above, the party Livable Netherlands had climbed to more than 20 seats in the polls with Pim Fortuyn as its leader. After the infamous interview in *de Volkskrant*, the question arose whether the support for LN had been support for the political party or support for the politician Fortuyn. The answer came quickly, with virtually all of the party's support transferring almost immediately to Fortuyn. Even before he had managed to put together a list of candidates and register his list as a political party, his showing in the polls was as high or even higher than support for LN had been. It was clear that at least a substantial portion of the Dutch electorate was basing its vote on the individual politician and his individual political ideas rather than on the party as such. In addition, the assassination of Fortuyn only nine days before the election may have removed some of the stigma associated with his person, which probably even accentuated the appeal of his person.

Finally, we should raise the question what consequences, if any, the Dutch case will have in Western Europe. Rydgren (2004) argues that the emergence of the party family of RRP parties partly may be explained by a cross-national diffusion of potent master frames. As the French Front National was highly successful in 1984 with a political profile combining ethno-nationalist xenophobia (based on the so-called ethno-pluralist doctrine) and anti-establishment populism, embryonic parties in other countries adopted a similar profile. However, although this profile was highly potent, as it was resonant with the pre-sentiments of large segments of the electorates within many countries, it failed to be so in some countries. In some countries, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, nationalism is less ethnically based than a result of pride in civic virtues (equality and tolerance, respectively). In these countries, a too pronounced ethno-nationalist message rather has a deterrent effect on the voters. However, the experience of the List Pim Fortuyn has shown that it is possible to mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments in other ways. It remains to be seen if this will influence actors elsewhere, and start a new process of cross-national diffusion.

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CONFIGURATIONS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF ELECTRICITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE¹

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The powerful movement of privatization and liberalization in European Economies has not resulted in a simple retreat of the state (e.g. Müller/ Wright 1994). Governments are re-regulating privatized enterprises and liberalized markets (for telecommunications see Grande 1994, Thatcher this volume). The most prominent explanation for the paradox of "privatization and deregulation" was provided by Giandomenico Majone who identified a paradigm shift from the "positive" or interventionist state to the regulatory state, following the US-American example (Majone 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1997; Seidman/ Gilmour 1986; Grande 1997). This shift has both a functional and a territorial dimension. Functionally, the post-Keynesian state adopts a different role in economic governance: from a role as producer of goods and services to that of a regulator of

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